¿Los experimentos de Libet niegan la existencia de la voluntad libre?
Resumen
En su laboratorio, Benjamin Libet les pidió a algunos participantes apretar un botón cuando lo decidieran. Pretendía medir, con un EEG, la secuencia entre el deseo de mover la muñeca, la activación del área motora cerebral y el movimiento. Los resultados parecen negar la voluntad libre: primero se da la actividad cerebral, luego el deseo consciente de mover la muñeca y, finalmente, el movimiento. Nuestro cerebro —y no nuestra voluntad— decidiría nuestras acciones. En este artículo cuestiono el aparato conceptual de tal explicación, haciendo énfasis en las nociones de voluntad, la relación mente-cuerpo y, sobre todo, la estructura de la conciencia.Descargas
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