Identificación e identidad en Harry Frankfurt

  • Teresa Enríquez Universidad Panamericana, Campus Aguascalientes, Departamento de Filosofía

Resumen

¿Qué es la identidad de la persona? El pensamiento de Harry Frankfurt y sus enmiendas, al hilo de objeciones de Velleman, Penelhum, Watson y Korsgaard, resulta ins­tructivo porque manifiesta los alcances y las limitaciones de una radicalización paulatina de la determinación puramente individual de la propia identidad volitiva. En este trabajo se expone esa trayectoria intelectual, que va desde los actos más controlables (identificación con el deseo de segundo orden y la identificación decisiva e incondicional) hasta los menos sujetos al control voluntario inmediato, pero también autoimpuestos (necesidades volitivas y necesidades del amor). Al final, Frankfurt admite cierto amor innato.

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Publicado
10-12-2018
Sección
Artículos