Hanna, Pippin y el debate del contenido no-conceptual
Resumen
En el presente artículo intento mostrar que si bien las críticas conceptualistas de Robert Pippin resultan efectivas para refutar versiones moderadas de no-conceptualismo, son insuficientes para frente al no-conceptualismo kantiano fuerte que Robert Hanna propone. Argumento que las debilidades de Pippin se deben a que (1) su argumento sobre la inseparabilidad de intuiciones y conceptos solo funciona con respecto a una concepción estrecha de cognición, (2) su rechazo de la existencia de intuiciones ciegas es inconsistente y (3) la compatibilidad entre Kant y Hegel que propone no es plausible.Descargas
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