Hanna, Pippin and the non-conceptual content debate
Abstract
In this article I try to show that although Robert Pippin’s conceptualist critiques against non-conceptualism are effective in order to refute moderate versions of non-conceptualism, they are insufficient to confront with Robert Hanna’s Kantian strong non-conceptualism. I argue that Pippin fails because (1) his argument on the inseparability of intuitions and concepts only works within a narrow conception of cognition, (2) his rejection of the existence of blind intuitions is inconsistent and (3) the Kantian-Hegelian compatibility that he proposes is not cogent.Downloads
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