On the First Argument of the Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space (from the starting point of Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant)

Abstract

This study explores the a priori articulation of intuition as formulated in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and more specifically, in the first argument of the "Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space." To tackle the challenges posed by Kant's understanding and its systematic presentation in this crucial section of the first Critique, it draws on Martin Heidegger's interpretation of Kant. Following some general and introductory reflections on the significance of the aforementioned transcendental foundational doctrine and its Heideggerian interpretation, the text concentrates on the argument supporting the non-empirical nature of space. By addressing specific issues in Kant's framework and the concrete unfolding of the nervus probandi of the previously mentioned first argument of the "Metaphysical Exposition," it portrays this argument as an anticipation of the non-conceptual (and thus, distinctly intuitive) character of the representation of space.