About the kantian difference between the perception judgements and the experience judgements

Abstract

P. F. Strawson says, in The Bounds of Sense, that the principal thesis that Immanuel Kant defend in the transcendental deduction of the categories is that for a series of diverse experiences to belong to a unique conscience, it is necessary that they be connected in such way that they constitute an temporarily extended experience of a unified objective world. This is the thesis of objectivity, where takes place the double happening of the term experience. Taking into consideration Kant's afirmation according to which there is only one experience in which all the perceptions are represented in a continuous connection and in accordance with laws, the first happening of the term experience must be substituted for the term perception. Then, the definitive formulation of the thesis of objectivity should pray like this: so that a series of perceptions belong to a unique conscience it is necessary that they be connected in such way that they constitute a temporarily extended experience of a unified objective world.