Identity, difference and contradiction in Hegel's Logic

Abstract

Within all philosophical systems there are some categories that are fundamental to the understanding of the whole. This is the case of categories such as identity, difference and contradiction in Hegel's philosophy. In the second book of the Logik, such categories are set in what appears to be the heart of the hegelian project: to establish a critical relation with transcendental philosophy that leads to a postkantian metaphysics, evident above all in the unity of the thinking subject and the thought object. That is why, this paper is structured into three main sections: 1), the relation that Hegel establishes with the Critique of Pure Reason, 2) an analysis of the categories of identity, difference and contradiction as they appear in the two versions of the Logik and, 3) some conclusions that arise from the vindication of the category of contradiction, without a doubt, the most controversial among the notions of the philosophy of the concept.