On the feasibility of an empirical and normative epistemology

Abstract

The three main concerns of epistemology throughout the XXth Century were the following: (1) provide a definition of knowledge; (2) provide plausible answers to the skeptical challenge and; (3) study our belief-forming processes in order to determine which of them are leading towards the acquisition of knowledge. In this paper, I argue that while these three concerns are intimately interrelated, the emphasis given to either one is leading to the development of quite different epistemological projects. In particular, a strong emphasis on (3) is conducive towards a naturalized epistemology. As I will show, the implementation of this particular project implies a deep questioning on the traditional way of conceiving the normative character of epistemology. My main contention is that the idea that epistemic norms are not necessarily universal does not imply, as has been argued by the critics of the naturalized epistemology project, the abandonment of the normative aspirations of epistemology.