Quine's three grades of modal involvement and modal non-cognitivism

Abstract

In this paper I examine Quine's sceptical treatment of propositional (de dicto) and non-propositional (de re) necessity through his theory of three grades of modal involvement. I argue that, although it has various valuable features, it suffers from some serious limitations that make it unsatisfactory; specifically, (i) it cannot offer a suitable basis for a non-eliminativist account of propositional necessity, given the very marginal role he assigns to this notion in our theoretical and practical lives, and (ii) it cannot provide an explanation of a posteriori necessity. In view of this I try to motivate a modal non-cognitivist account (an anti-realist account that aims to provide an explanation of our modalizing based only on modest and mundane resources) as, potentially, the best response to Quine's sceptical treatment, this for two reasons: because it respects important Quinean concerns and desiderata and it can remediate the limitations that affect Quine's account of necessity.