Valuing our humanity

Abstract

In this paper I discuss the different attitudes that are involved in "valuing" our humanity as Kant understands it. The distinct attribute of humanity is the capacity for rational and moral choice. I argue that valuing our moral capacity commits us to caring about being morally good, but not to thinking that it renders us superior to the other animals. Valuing people as ends in themselves also involves an attitude towards people's capacity of rational choice. I distinguish two views of what this attitude is: regarding rationality as valuable property and regarding it as the source of normative standing. Kant's casuistical arguments reflect both views, and together suggest that view we should regard our normative standing as a valuable property. Finally, I argue that Kant is committed to the view that regarding ourselves as ends-in-our-selves involves thinking that our natural interests are worth satisfying a sense of end-in-itself that can be extended to the other animals.