Space, movement, and non-conceptual content in Kant’s philosophy of experience
Abstract
In a famous passage, Kant said that “the thoughts without content are empties, the intuitions without concepts are blind”, which has given place, from the hand of classical and contemporaries philosophers and scholars, like McDowell, to the idea that the mental states which Kant calls intuitions have conceptual content. This article proposes a lecture that makes emphasis on independence or separability between intuitions and concepts, and how the firsts constitutes a kind of cognition that while is non-conceptual, is enough for the individuation of particulars.Downloads
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