Mirroring and portraying in Fregean semantics
Abstract
Gottlob Frege held that concept-words refer only to concepts not to objects, and that singular terms refer only to objects not to concepts. These claims give rise to the concept paradox according to which ‘The concept F’ does not refer to a concept at all. Mark Textor asserts that his mirroring principle (MP) explains the source of this problem. However, I argue that Textor’s paper falls short in explaining all the consequences that follow Frege’s claims, and that my semantic ontological assumption (SSO) can be seen as a consequence of Textor’s mirroring principle.Downloads
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