Kant and Pirrohnian skepticism: Some clues to a kantian perspective, in skeptiptic sense

Abstract

The objective that I pursue is to highlight the importance of Pyrrhonian skepticism in the development and consolidation of critical-transcendental idealism. For this I use an metaphysical point of view, very different from the one that has been done in the specialized bibliography, about the influence of skepticism in Kant; with the introduction of the notion of argumental resonance as a guide, under the assumption of the unknowability of things in themselves and of transcendentality. The result of this argumental road is the updating of an old problem about the influence of Pyrrhonian skepticism on Kant, with the addition of presenting it in a metaphysical context, that is, the process and consolidation of the Kantian proposal that goes from a dogmatic-rationalist period to his own proposal by virtue of Pyrrhonian skepticism. My conclusion is that such skeptical argumental resonance has been irreproachable since his pre-critical, critical and posthumous period.