Overcoming morality's blind spot: A review of Peter Singer's psychomoral assumptions in his defense of effective altruism

Abstract

In his defense of effective altruism, Peter Singer has studied various biases that limit the capacity for moral reasoning, two stand out in particular: tribalism and the identifiable victim effect. These biases reveal the existence of a sort of moral blind spot that hinders altruism toward unknown individuals. When making normative proposals, Singer returns to a strong notion of moral reasoning that seems immune to the effect of biases, that is, he ends up committing to a notion of reason untethered from the affective component. In light of contemporary moral psychology, especially Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model, this understanding of moral reasoning represents an obstacle to the effectiveness of effective altruism. The objective of this article is to critically review the psychological and moral assumptions underlying Singer’s defense of effective altruism, particularly in light of Haidt’s social intuitionism. Additionally, I will analyze how Haidt’s notion of bottom-up moral learning could help overcome this criticism while preserving Singer’s altruistic.