Moralizing and punishing. How to think philosophy in Latin America in the age of cancellation?

Abstract

This article argues that cancel culture can be understood as a form of informal punitive practice, legitimized by forms of contemporary moralism, which tends to undermine basic conditions of philosophical inquiry, such as rational deliberation, rational disagreement, and the critical evaluation of ideas. To develop this thesis, first, I offer a conceptual characterization of cancel culture, emphasizing its punitive dimension and its relation to contemporary forms of moralism. Second, I analyze three specific philosophical problems that emerge from these practices: 1) the tension between freedom of expression and censorship, 2) the limits of punishment and the erosion of due process, and 3) the distinction between author and work in contexts of moral sanction. Finally, I argue that, in the face of these tensions, philosophy should not assume the role of a moral tribunal, but rather that of a critical practice aimed at preserving the conditions for rational disagreement. From this perspective, I will argue that the expansion of informal punitive logics in the academic sphere not only transforms modes of public interaction, but also affects the conditions of possibility for philosophical work. Therefore, far from ignoring or dismissing the phenomenon, philosophy must examine it critically, recognizing both the legitimate demands that drive it and the risks it entails.