Fundamental ontology or theory of knowledge? The Heidegger’s crític of neokantism

Abstract

In 1929 spring, a philosophical encounter occurs in the University of Davos between Germany and France. The central subject was the question What is the man? As opposed to the expectation to presence a debate between the French philosophy and the German one, the center of the encounter was the dispute between one of the last and more illustrious representatives of Marburgo School, Ernst Cassirer, and who was formed, just few years ago, within the purest tradition of neokantism, Martin Heidegger. Here was clear the landslide of one of the more important twentieth century philosophical schools, the neokantism, and the definitive victory of a philosophical movement that during some time was compatible with the first one: the phenomenology in the heideggerian ontological version. The frame of the battle was the conflict between two concepts of philosophy. In one hand, the neokantian philosophy that understood the world and the man like tematizables scopes by the theoretical and practical analysis. And in the other, the fundamental ontology, for which the question is centered in the finite constitution of man's being like condition of possibility of all science or disciplines (theorical or practical).