Moorean inferences and the strength of the epistemic position

  • José Alfonso Anaya Ruiz Esparza Departamento de Filosofía, University of Warwick

Abstract

In this article I analyze Martin Smith’s diagnosis of what is wrong with Moorean inferences, according to which these exhibit an epistemic defect incapable of increasing the reliability of their conclusion. Smith thinks this defect can be used to explain the phenomenon of epistemic warrant transmission failure. I will argue that Smith’s proposal is mistaken in supposing that the only way in which there can be warrant transmission is by increasing the reliability of the conclusion. I propose that, when the evidence increases the probability that the conclusion is true, the epistemic position about it improves, which could result in an epistemic warrant for it as well.

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References

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Published
10-12-2018
Section
Artículos