Peirce and a possible intervention in the debate about the character of the empirical content
Abstract
Charles Sanders Peirce made enormous contributions to different branches of philosophy. Among the topics discussed was, more firmly in his maturity, the issue of perception and specifically the relationship between perception (percept) and empirical judgment. Taking into account a certain general picture of pragmatism, we propose to situate Peirce in the context of the current debate about the nature of empirical content. The result of this operation is a critique of the current schematic options for approaching the nature of perception. Under this hermeneutical key, Peirce’s originality in the aforementioned topic can be highlighted.Downloads
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