Perceiving that one perceives. Adam of Wodeham’s comentary of De Anima III.2 425b 11-17
Abstract
The aim of this article is to reconstruct part of Adam of Wodeham’s theory of reflexibility. This reconstruction is based on the analysis that he himself offers from a fragment in De Anima III.2 425b 11-17. In this fragment, Wodeham argues that we can access certain of our own mental states —i. e. first-order intuitive cognitions— through certain second-order states —i. e. intuitive reflexive cognitions—. However, for Wodeham, in virtue of a second-order intuition, an agent cannot access to the content of a first order-state. This is not consistent with the idea that the content of an intuitive cognition is intrinsically determined, for if this was the case, theoretically we could access such content in virtue of a second-order state directed at the first one.Downloads
References
Aristóteles (2003), Acerca del alma, traducción de Tomás Calvo Martínez, Madrid, Gredos.
Aristotelis Latinus Database (2010), Turnhaut, Brepols Publishers.
Averroes (Ibn Rushd) de Cordoba (2009), Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, traducción de Richard C. Taylor, New Haven, Yale University Press.
Averrois Cordubensis (1953), Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros, edición de F. Stuart Crawford, Cambridge, Mass., The Mediaeval Academy of America.
Brower-Toland, Susan (2017), “Causation and mental content: Against the externalist reading of Ockham”, en Jenny Pelletier y Magali Roques (coords.), The Language of Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy, Cham, Springer, pp. 59-80.
Brower-Toland, Susan (2014), “William Ockham on the scope and limits of consciousness”, Vivarium, vol. 52, núms. 3-4, pp. 197-219.
Brower-Toland, Susan (2012), “Medieval approaches to consciousness: Ockham and Chatton”, Philosophers Imprint, vol. 12, pp. 1-29.
Butler, Keith (1997), “Externalism, internalism, and knowledge of content”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 57, núm. 4, pp. 773-800.
Byrne, Alex (2005), “Perception and conceptual content”, en Matthias Steup y Ernest Sosa (coords.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 231-250.
Carter, Adam, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palernos y Duncan Pritchard (2014), “Varieties of externalism”, Philosophical Issues. A Supplement of Noûs, vol. 24, núm. 1, pp. 63-109.
Caston, Victor (2002), “Aristotle on consciousness”, Mind, vol. 111, núm. 444, pp. 751-815.
Choi, Philip (2016), “Ockham’s weak externalism”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 6, núm. 24, pp. 1075-1096.
Courtenay, William J. (2008), Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought, Leiden/Boston, E. J. Brill.
Courtenay, William J. (1978), Adam Wodeham: An Introduction to His Life and Writings, Leiden, E. J. Brill.
Gamboa, Lydia Deni (2018), “Can we reflexively access the contents of our own perceptions? Ockham on the reflexive cognition of the contents of intuitions”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 27, núm. 5, pp. 921-940. DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2018.1537255.
Gennaro, Rocco J. (ed.) (2004), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness, Ámsterdam, John Benjamins.
Karger, Élizabeth (2015), “Was Adam Wodeham an internalist or an externalist?”, en Gyula Klima (coord.), Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy, Nueva York, Fordham University Press, pp. 186-203.
Keele, Rondo (2010), Ockham Explained: From Razor to Rebellion, Chicago, Open Court.
Kim, Jaegwon (2006), Philosophy of Mind, Boulder, Westview Press.
Lycan, William G. (1996), Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press.
Matthen, Mohan (ed.) (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, Oxford, UK, Oxford Handbooks Online.
McKinsey, Michael (2007), “Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent”, en Brian P. McLaughlin y Jonathan Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Malden, Blackwell, pp. 53–66.
McKinsey, Michael (2002), “Forms of externalism and privileged access”, Philosophical Perspectives, Language and Mind, vol. 16, pp. 199-224.
Nanay, Bence (2015), “Perceptual representation/perceptual content”, en Mohan Matthen (coord.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, Oxford, UK, Oxford Handbooks Online, pp. 1-20.
Ockham, Guillelmus (1981), Quaestiones in Librum Secundum Sententiarum (Reportatio), vol. V, Nueva York, Editiones Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae.
Ockham, Guillelmus (1974), Summa Logicae, vol. I, Nueva York, Editiones Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae.
O’Connor, Timothy y David Robb (eds.) (2003), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings, Londres, Routledge.
Panaccio, Claude (2015), “Ockham’s externalism”, en Gyula Klima (coord.), Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy, Nueva York, Fordham University Press, pp. 166-185.
Putnam, Hilary (1984), El significado de “significado”, México, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
Rosenthal, David M. (2002), “How many kinds of consciousness?”, Consciousness and Cognition, vol. 11, núm. 4, pp. 653-665.
Seager, William (1999), Theories of Consciousness, Nueva York/Los Ángeles, Routledge.
Slotemaker, John T. y Jeffrey C. Witt (2012), “Adam of Wodeham”, en Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [http://stanford.library.usyd.edu.au/entries/wodeham/#Wri], consultado: 18 de agosto de 2015.
Speaks, Jeff (2006), “What sorts of things are the contents of perception?”, en Jeff Speaks [https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/mcgill/515/content-of-perception.html], consultado: 15 de noviembre de 2018.
Wodeham, Adam (1990), Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum, Prologus et distinctio I-XXVI, St. Bonaventure, St. Bonaventure University.
Wood, Rega (2003), “Adam of Wodeham”, en Jorge J. E. Gracia y Timothy B. Noone (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Malden, Blackwell, pp. 77-85.
Wright, Crispin (2011), “McKinsey one more time”, en A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford/Nueva York, Oxford University Press, pp. 80-104.
