Can a Kantian be partial to his loved ones? A discussion against recurring objections
Abstract
In this article I show that duly justified partiality towards our loved ones is part of the Kantian moral project. Unlike the critics who advocate a reading in which the impartiality of the judgment in this ethics forces not to take into account personal relationships when making moral decisions, I defend the hypothesis that a Kantian can be partial with his loved ones, this for systematic and textual reasons.Downloads
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